Recently, the Ukrainian and international media have been actively discussing a possible Russian influence on Gagausia, an autonomous region in southern Moldova. This region has a special place in Moldovan politics and history, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
However, there are many contradictions between Chisinau and Gagauzh comrat, which sharply aggravated after the start of a full -scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine. While the Moldavian authorities have severely condemned Russian aggression, Gagauzia was on the forefront of the "Russian world" in Moldova. In autonomy, they talked about possible separation, threatening Chisinau's appearance of another separatist pro -Russian region.
Photo with Putin and “Peace”
Immediately after the start of a full -scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine seemed that Transnistria would be the most vulnerable point for Moldova. But Tiraspol, realizing his increased dependence on Chisinau and Kiev, tried to distance himself as possible from the war.
But the authorities of Gagauz autonomy, where there were always strong pro -Russian sentiment, decided not to restrain herself. It actively criticizes Chisinau for a sharp turn to Europe and requires defrosting cooperation with Russia. Moreover, they threaten to leave Moldova - for example, if it decides to unite with Romania or even simply "enters some organization with supranational structures" (read: EU), "losing part of its sovereignty."
The catalyst for the exacerbation was the victory in the election of Bashkan (head) of Gagausia in the spring of 2023 Eugene Hutsul, who had never been engaged in politics before. She was arriving from the Shore Party Oligarch-fugitive Ilan Schora, a prison for theft from the Moldovan budget at the age of 15.
Shortly after the Gagauz election, the Moldova authorities recognized the Shore Party Antconstitutional. As a result, Hutsul joined the post, but unlike the previous heads of autonomy, did not enter the Moldovan government, contrary to the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia. Maya Sandu President refuses to sign the appropriate decree, citing the fact that the Hutsul is in a "criminal group".
The party's ban did not repel from Ilan Shore the desire to engage in politics in Moldova. Since 2019, he has been hiding from justice in Israel, and this year he relocated to Moscow, from where he continues his political activity. Hutsul victory was provided by the mass bribery of voters, promises to build an airport and Disneyland in Gagauzia (more precisely, Gagauziyaland), as well as agitation for friendship with Russia and against Moldova's accession to the EU.
Eugene Hutsul completely divides the line of his party boss. After the victory in the Gagauz elections, she became part of Russia, where it is accepted at the highest level and represented almost the leader of the entire Moldovan opposition. In March, at the World Youth Festival in Sochi Hutsul even discussed Vladimir Putin, taking a common photo with him.
Vladimir Putin and Eugene Hutsul
In April, the head of Gagauzia went to the Russian Federation again. The result of the trip was an agreement with the Promsvyazbank - the main bank of the Russian defense sector - about the accrual of Gagauz state employees and pensioners of allowances on the Card "Mir". Moldova does not work with Russian banks, but bypassing the possibilities of receiving money still exist. And if something does not go out, the responsibility for the failure, as always, will be able to collapse on Chisinau, which deprives the Gagauzi of the promised money.
Conflict over conflict
The pro -Russian moods of Gagauz are largely due to history. This Turkic ethnic group, which professes Orthodoxy, settled in the territory of Moldova in the early nineteenth century at the invitation of Alexander I, who wanted to strengthen the new borders of the state in this way (Bessarabia was annexed to the Russian Empire in 1812). Gagauz was exempted from taxes and services in the army, allowed to conduct the farm. Since then, they have a good attitude towards Russia.
After the Second World War, Gagauzes were repressed and deportation as the accomplices of Romanian fascists, but at their sympathies it did not affect Russia. When the Moldovan (then renamed in Romanian) in 1989 became the main state language, Gagauz and Transnistria saw a threat in this and declared independence in 1990. But in Gagausia, it did not come to war. In 1994, the region returned to Moldova on autonomy.
The Moldovan authorities often give this case as an example of a successful solution to ethno-territorial conflict and proposes Transnistria to return on the same conditions-broad autonomy rights without federalization. However, in Tiraspol, they are in no hurry to agree, seeing how difficult the relationship of Chisinau and the Committee after reintegration.
Despite the return to Moldova, Gagauzi constantly conflict with the Moldovan authorities, accusing Chisinau of failure to observe their autonomous rights and freedoms. They are most indignant that the status of autonomy has not been enshrined in the Constitution, although at first they agreed. In Chisinau, it is denied that the Law on Special Legal Status details all the rights and powers of Gagauzia, and therefore it is not necessary to change the constitution.
Conflicts also arose on linguistic soil. 68.2% of Gagauz still do not speak the state language. Education is conducted in Russian, and even Gagauz is studied optional. Komrat reproaches the center in the reluctance to open new schools in Romanian in autonomy. The capital believes that the training centers are enough, but Gagauzes do not want to learn the state.
Foreign policy is another constant source of conflict. If, even under the pro -Russian authorities, Kishin was able to balance between Moscow and the West, then Komrat always stood in clear pro -Russian positions. In 2014, when Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the EU, Gagauzia held a referendum on joining the Customs Union. At the same time, the law on delayed sovereignty was adopted, which determines the right of Gagauz to re -emerge from Moldova, if it loses the "status of an independent state".
Chisinau did not recognize the legitimacy of the referendum, but Moscow supported it in words. The Kremlin has always used pro -Russian sentiment in Gagauzi and Transnistria to keep Moldova in the area of their interests.
For example, Gagauz politicians have always accused Chisinau for creating artificial obstacles to trade with Russia, although it was in 2005 who restricted the import of Moldovan products in 2005, from which Gagauza was injured. There was a critic for the oppression of the rights of Russian -speaking Gagauz, the ban on the broadcasting of Russian TV channels, the forced transfer of record keeping from Russian into Romanian and in general disrespect for Gagauz as such. In general, a good example for the Transnistrian settlement of the Gagauz case did not.
Read also: Conflict on the sidelines. Why no one tries to solve the Transnistrian problem
Interdependent relationships
However, even after all the recent exacerbations, Komrat is still not ready for a sharp escalation of relations with the central government under the Transnistrian scenario. Despite all the complexity of relations, autonomy is deeply integrated into the political and financial and economic life of Moldova.
The Bashkhan assigned a place within the Moldovan government (although with Eugene Hutsul, we recall, the situation is different), and the people's assembly - the local parliament - can influence the decisions of Chisinau if they affect the interests of Gagauz. At the same time, the central government has no right to interfere with the work of Bashkan and Gagauz deputies. Conducting elections, formation of executive and legislative bodies are also the prerogative of autonomy.
The competence of the Gagauz authorities also includes the development and distribution of the local budget. At the same time, Chisinau has the right to control the spending of funds, since Gagauzia is the most subsidized region: 70% of the budget of the region falls on subsidies from the state budget of Moldova, and only 30% are formed at the expense of their own taxes and fees. Almost all taxes collected in Gagauzia remain in the local budget, although other regions initially transfer them to the state.
Numerous benefits and gragus grants are explained by the poverty of the region. The average salary does not exceed $ 450 (the All -Moldovan figure is $ 600). In addition, autonomy is located in the steppe terrain and is constantly experiencing water shortages. It is difficult to develop agriculture in such circumstances in such circumstances - it is difficult, and without additional support.
International donors - Turkey and the European Union - also help Gagauz. Money goes to the construction of roads, hospitals, schools, kindergartens, water systems. As a result, the infrastructure in pro -Russian gagauzia began to develop faster than in the Moldovan regions supporting the pro -European vector. But Chisinau is ready to pay this price so that he is no longer reproached in ignoring the problems of autonomy.
Gagauzia is also built into the foreign trade relations of Moldova. Local entrepreneurs are actively enjoying the possibility of free trade with the EU, increasing the turnover with the European market every year. Thus, in 2022, the EU share in Gagauz exports (mainly alcohol and agricultural products) exceeded 42%. For comparison, the share of Russia is barely 8%.
The EU is also the main focus of the Gagauz labor migration. Like residents of other regions of Moldova, Gagauza receives romanian citizenship in large numbers to facilitate their stay in the West. Meanwhile, the number of Moldovan citizens who have been working in Russia has been steadily declining in recent years. And Gagauz this trend also applies.
You will not call the foreign policy differences of the Comrade and Chisinau also insurmountable. Of course, the Gagauz's relations with the center improved when there were pro -Russian parties in power in Moldova, whether the Communist Party of Vladimir Voronin, or the Socialist Party of Igor Dodon. But also Volodymyr Plahotnyuk's Departy, who had the rules of the country, found common ground with Gagauz, let them bribe the local elites or promise them bread positions. Gagausia has never emerged in Gagauzia, which simplified the task of moving to the Moldovan authorities for their ranks of autonomy politicians.
Maya Sandu, who, after coming to power in December 2020, promised to unite all the citizens of Moldova, at first also got well with the Gagauz. With it in autonomy, large infrastructure projects began to start. One of them is the construction of transmission lines from the Romanian city of Isakcha through the Gagauz volcano in Chisinau to reduce the dependence on the supply of Transnistrian electricity. In addition, the proximity of Gagauzia to the Danube ports has pushed the development in the autonomy of land transport, especially railways.
The election season
Only a few years ago it seemed that the differences between Comrate and Chisinau remained in the past and the parties began dialogue. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine again brought foreign policy to the fore. Gagauzia needed Ilan Schora to destabilize the situation throughout Moldova. Russia is also interested in Russia, which, because of aggression against Ukraine, has lost the support of a large part of Moldovan society. To restore the influence and compromise President of Sandu, the Kremlin is ready to combine with anyone. Even with a shore, which has recently been banned from entering Russia on charges of financial fraud.
This fall this fall presidential elections in Moldova open up new opportunities for escalation. Shore, which will clearly become the main expressner of the Kremlin's interests, cannot participate in the race, but promises to nominate a single candidate from the opposition. In April, he gathered in Moscow loyal politicians, uniting them into the Victory block. The entire Gagauz Elite was present at the rise in the Russian capital, and Bashkan Hutsul even became the executive secretary of the association.
The electoral prospects of both "victories" and the candidate's candidate from the opposition are doubtful. But the key purpose of Moscow in the Moldavian elections-2024 is not to win the pro-Russian forces, but to shake the pro-European consensus formed in the country and to reduce the popularity of Sandu. So that after the end of the war with the Kremlin, it is easier to return Moldova to the pro -Russian camp.
However, it will not be easy to realize even such limited goals. European integration is supported by most Moldova residents, and Sandu has every chance of re -election. On all the power of pro -Russian sentiment in Gagauzia, only 150,000 people live there - less than 5% of the country's population, so residents of autonomy will not have a decisive influence on the electoral picture. In addition, regardless of political views, Gagauses consider themselves primarily by Moldova citizens and do not want serious confrontation with Chisinau. They do not survive on their own, but hopes for the help of Russia is unrealistic, especially because of the lack of common borders.
To overcome the Kremlin and Schora, the Moldavian authorities are trying to establish a direct dialogue with ghosts (mayors) of Gagauz villages bypassing Bashkan. In addition, the funds from the state budget began to come directly to the heads of Gagauz municipalities (cities with special status) and villages.
Formally, nothing has changed, but for Bashkan and her teams, which so far have little to present to the population, except for Putin's photos, it has become a serious blow. Attempts by the Gagauz authorities to prohibit the heads of villages to communicate with Chisinau bypassing the Commrate yet. Shore is unlikely to be ready to invest in Gagausia money from your own pocket. And if its protege Hutsul does not return control over the funds from the state budget of Moldova, then it will not be easy to maintain popularity.
However, the roots of Gagauz's distrust of Chisinau reaches much deeper than the fraud of shore or Kremlin. Sooner or later, Moldova will have to develop a clear program of building relationships with a habitat autonomy. But such a plan on the horizon is not visible.
