The situation does not contribute to the bold offensive operations of the Ukrainian army, recognizes military observer Mykola Belleskov in the column for The Atlantic Council. So, the only reasonable plan for 2024 is defensive.
The full -scale invasion of Russia is approaching a two -year term, and for the military and political leadership of Ukraine it is important to learn the lessons of 2022 and 2023.
The most important conclusion that can be made from the last two years of fighting is the dominance of defense war over offensive operations. This has been demonstrated many times, starting with the failure of Russia's blitzkrig in the first month of the war.
The second key lesson is the importance of balance between political goals and military capabilities. Political considerations forced both Russia and Ukraine to start an offensive with insufficient forces, which led to great losses.
Although Ukraine remains a complete liberation of the country from the Russian occupation, current circumstances do not contribute to bold offensive operations. On the International Front, the US and the EU commitments to assist have faced serious political obstacles, while attempts to expand the production of military equipment and weapons were far behind the schedule. In Ukraine, there is increased concern due to the high amount of losses and potential lack of labor.
In view of this, the military strategy of Ukraine for 2024 should focus on maintaining the front line and ensuring constant control over about 82% of the country remaining in the hands of Ukraine. The strategic transition to active defense will be consistent with the current force of Ukraine, allowing to win precious time for regrouping and re -equipment the day before, probably more favorable conditions in 2025.
It is important that a more defensive position will allow Ukraine to use the urgent need of Moscow in victories. Since the Russian army is under a great political pressure in anticipation of promotion, Ukrainian commanders will have many opportunities for stable bleeding of Putin's invasion forces, just as they do in Avdiivka now.
In parallel, Ukraine should strive to continue to reduce the ability of Russia to wage war through the escalation of the Air Force campaign for purposes far beyond the front line throughout the occupied Ukraine and Russia itself. This can take into account the attacks on the focus of troops, military bases and ammunition depots, as well as logistical centers and weapons production.
By adopting an active defense strategy in 2024, Kyiv can achieve a double goal-to prevent any significant promotion of Russia and to create conditions that will promote Ukraine's success in the war on exhaustion. This would create the basis for returning to offensive operations in 2025.
The effectiveness of any defense strategy in 2024 will depend to a large extent on the level of support from Ukraine's partners. As for weapons supply, priorities will take into account the huge number of artillery ammunition along with radio electronic fighting systems, percussion drones, additional means of air defense and long range missiles. The hot expected arrival of F-16 fighter jets in the coming months will also significantly increase Ukraine's ability to deprive Russia of control over the sky.
If this military assistance is provided, Ukraine will be able to implement the active defense strategy over the next year, as well as prepare for future offensives. This training should contain advanced training programs for the Ukrainian military in NATO countries. While tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have already been trained in the first two years of the war, failures on the front line in the second half of 2023 showed the shortcomings of these efforts. Obviously, it takes much more time to give Ukrainian soldiers the military knowledge and skills needed to success on the battlefield.
The transition to active defense in 2024 will not prevent Ukraine from taking specific offensive actions. The most likely focus of the offensive operations of Ukraine will be the Crimean peninsula occupied by Russia in the next year. This was confirmed by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky in a recent interview with The Economist.
The systematic destruction of Russian logistical and military potential in Crimea has pursued two important goals during 2024. First, it will help to ensure the freedom of trade navigation in the Black Sea, based on the recent progress of Ukraine in the breakthrough of the Russian maritime blockade of ports. Secondly, it would prevent the Kremlin's efforts to supplement the supply of the Russian army in the south of Ukraine, potentially creating weak points along the Land War front.
Ukraine's success in the Battle of the Black Sea demonstrated a power of Western weapons in combination with the skill and ingenuity of the Ukrainian military. Further breakthroughs in the Crimea and at sea of 2024 will depend on the readiness of Ukraine's partners to supply the necessary missiles.
Calls to Ukraine to approve a defense strategy in the coming year far from optimism, which was raised in early 2023 after Ukraine's high -profile victories near Kharkiv and Kherson. Although some observers will inevitably consider this position a pessimistic or even defeat, it reflects the current realities of war and is the most likely way to success. Indeed, if Ukraine's transition to active defense in 2024 paths to a possible victory, future historians will consider it prudent and wise.
Vladimir Putin openly prepares his country for a long war, and is inspired by signs of weakness among Western allies of Ukraine. In order to defeat the Kremlin dictator and put an end to the threat that comes from the revival of Russian imperialism, Ukraine and its international partners must cease to think of categories of individual offenses and take a longer -term approach to this historical task.
