Recent events in Ukraine and the surrounding region give rise to serious reflections on Russia's ability to mobilize its military resources. According to a report from the American Institute for War Study (ISW), the Russian defense-industrial complex (defense) faces a number of challenges that can complicate Russia's ability to fully mobilize its military potential.
Even despite Russia's efforts to support the current pace of military operations and constant efforts to expand the OPC, ISW expresses doubts about the ability of the Russian OPC to fully meet the needs of large personnel mobilization. According to ISW estimates, Russia will probably be able to expand its defense-industrial base and accumulate resources in the event of supporting the initiative on the battlefield in 2024. However, even in this case, it is likely that Russia's efforts will not be sufficient to provide significant masses of mobilized reservists or conscripts this year.
Coordinator of the Information Resistance group Konstantin Mashovets indicated that the Russian OPC can produce about 250-300 new or upgraded tanks a year. He also noted that Russian troops can overhaul and modernize another 250-300 tanks, similar to the situation with combat armored vehicles. However, even in such circumstances, Russian defense is not capable of producing enough materials to equip large Russian reserves as needed.
, the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia , in March 2023, stated that the Russian defense industry could produce 1,500 major combat tanks in 2023, which provides for the average level of production of 125 tanks per month.
Regardless of grades and statements, there are obvious questions that remain unanswered. Will Russia be capable of rapid and effective mobilization of its military resources in case of exacerbation of conflict? Can the Russian OPC quickly adapt to changes in military needs and produce the necessary equipment in the right amount?
