Alexei Navalny's death is certainly a difficult blow to the liberal opposition in Russia.
Despite the difficult relationship of Navalny with other representatives of this group (for example, with Yavlinsky and Khodorkovsky), he was still the most striking and most famous in the Russian Federation and in the world by Putin's opponent. And, if there were suddenly radical changes in Russia (for example, in the case of Putin's death), then a bulk, as the figure that systematically supports the West, could immediately become a point of gravity for a large part of the Russian elites.
Now there is no such figure and not the fact that it will be able to appear in the future, given the total discord in liberal circles and the fact that most of their leaders are abroad.
Boris Nadezhdin, although he was supportively supported by almost all liberal opposition (in particular, Khodorkovsky and Navalny), is not allowed to participate in the election in the election of the anti -war and protest potential of Russian society, but in this environment he is not trustworthy. Many consider it a "Kremlin puppet". The Kremlin, by the way, can really try to expose Nadiazhdin to replace Navalny as a "leader of the liberal and anti -war opposition." If, of course, Putin generally wants to leave the Russian liberals at least some institutional and legal niche, not "eliminate them as a class".
Ukraine and Western leaders will certainly use Navalny's death as another argument in favor of the West should give even more weapons and impose even more sanctions against Russia. In this regard, as well as what happened, the visit of Zelensky to Europe, the Russian Federation had already arisen a conspiracy theory that the death of the opposition could organize some of the introduced "agents" of foreign intelligence in order to "strengthen the signal" from Zelensky.
However, this conspiracy is frankly weak, since the death of the Navalny is a unambiguous disadvantage. As because of the loss of a figure that could be bet in case of changing the situation in Russia. And in image terms. Navalny is another example that the guarantees and the "roof" of the event do not work. And he cannot protect those he supports. Moreover, almost the entire arsenal of measures against the Russian Federation was already used after Putin's invasion of Ukraine.
Another question is that the death of Navalny will further complicate any dialogue of Russia and the West (in particular, to the end of the war in Ukraine), and there may be a version that the opposition was killed by those who do not want to restore this dialogue and go on any agreement. But, on the other hand, much more impact on the prospects of dialogue has what is happening in Ukraine. And against this background, the death of Navalny is unlikely to be a decisive factor.
In general, what happened is another eloquent signal to Russian society and elites that anyone who challenges the Kremlin will be erased to the powder. And no matter who it is-the adventurer-pillar and owner of the private army Prigogine, his associate of the neonacist Utkin or supported by the event Liberal Navalny. Summary one.
