Russia has to abandon its main military theory of deep offensive operations, evidenced by military expert Konstantin Mashovets. The enemy learns and tries to adapt to the modern war.
The Russian military command continues in the process of organizing and planning the use of troops at the operational level on the so-called theory of "deep offensive operation" (if simply, it is a theory of how quickly and effectively to break through the enemy defense system at the operational depth and where to "engage" their troops. It considers it as the most effective and complete means of achieving the most decisive defeat of the enemy's troops and consistent fulfillment of the tasks set before the troops at the operational and strategic levels.
However, under the influence of current realities, during the current Russian-Ukrainian war , it is forced to partially review the basic practical techniques and methods of its use. Especially in the part of the relationship of its individual stages and elements. As it turned out, a number of its provisions and principles formulated before the Second World War, now simply does not correspond to reality, in particular:
- The real firing capabilities of the operational groups of Russian troops today do not fully allow to ensure a radical decrease in the level of stability of the defense system of the Armed Forces, and, not only at the operational level, but even in the tactical zone. And this, for its part, leaves the Russian command of the opportunity to quickly and at all depth make its breakthrough, which is a "basic" condition for conducting such an operation.
In other words, the real ability of the Russian troops at the tactical and operational levels existing at the tactical and operational levels, starting with the firing suppression of the enemy at the forefront, ending with the fire damage to the goals in the operational depth of enemy troops - KP, enemy reserves. In terms of volume, scale and intensity, simply does not allow the same “operational offensive operation” properly.
This situation is even more complicated if the opponent has the ability to fight an effective counter -battery and, in fact, can inflict effective fire damage to the entire depth of the operational construction of the Russian troops. In other words, Russian operational groups of troops, to date, cannot, at the specified speed and efficiency, break the enemy's defense, which at least comparable to them with fire capabilities and has become defensive actions at the prepared boundaries and positions. In particular, this applies to the so -called "standard" parameters of offensive actions, which are invested in the concept of "deep operational operation" (corresponding pace, scope and speed) ...
- Achieving such an element important for the success of a “deep offensive operation” as an operational suddenness of troops , in the current realities of existing realities is either impossible at all, or only “conditionally possible”. Especially in those conditions where the enemy has quite effective means and methods of intelligence, which allow him to understand the meaning of regrouping of Russian forces and means not only at operational-tactical, but even, in fact, at the tactical levels.
In other words, any concentration, deployment, or simply moving the formations from the battalion and above, to date, it is very difficult for the Russians to hide. And this is also a problem for organizing and conducting a “deep offensive operation”.
-the latest "technological changes" in the complex of weapons and military equipment (OVT) , which significantly changed the very essence and content of actions of forces and means, not only at the operational level, but also at the tactical, also significantly changed the "technology" of organization and conduct of any offensive operations.
Unsuccessful attempts of Russian command to act within the framework and templates of previously existing theory (fire suppression of the enemy + "pressure and maneuver") without taking into account the technological factor we could repeatedly observe during the present war (yes, these are the same "onset of Russian divisions" suppression of the defense system of Ukrainian troops). The last example with Avdiivka in this respect is very indicative.
Sometimes it was the impression that the Russian command, during the organization and conduct of offensive actions simply does not take into account a number of technological factors-from the fact that it is possible to install mine-explosive barriers (Ministry of Internal Affairs) now it is possible remotely (and at sufficiently considerable distances), ending with the fact that it is now in the air. Moreover, this is not only true of the tactical zone.
Even a trifle as a significant reduction in the time of the Ukrainian troops (if simply, it is the time between the moment of detection of the enemy before the firing damage to it) for some reason by the Russian command during the organization of its own large-scale offensive actions or is not taken into account at all or is not taken into account. They continue in the classic format to move quietly on the weekends of columns, quietly unfold in combat orders and act as "written in a combat statute".
The fact that they may now be seen from afar, during the nomination, or in the area of concentration (and apply the appropriate fire damage to them), Russian commanders are often not taken into account, or taken into account only formally.
However, unfortunately, the Russians learn very quickly. The above described and a number of other objective changes that influence the practical application of the Russian command of the theory of deep operation, recently prompted the enemy to introduce a number of "innovations" into their actions at the operational level. In particular:
-The Russian command in the framework of increasing the firing capabilities of its operational groups began to form enough powerful new parts and connections , including even artillery divisions (2 brigade composition). There is a significant increase in the quantitative composition of the already expanded artillery component of these groups. It increases in its quantitative measurement of the proportion of large caliber artillery (the so -called high capacity artillery).
- The enemy is actively trying to counteract our army intelligence at an operational level . Moreover, it uses a whole range of methods and tools. Sometimes, quite non -trivial. For example, he is quite seriously engaged in the legend of certain movements of his formations, actively uses misinformation, including in the public-information sphere, "crush" the movement of any of his more or less significant formations by the method of "scatter operational and tactical rear of filtration and raising measures, is engaged in radio masking, etc.
- there is a redistribution between the structural parts of the enemy operational groups in accordance with the innovations. We can observe the bulk of the parts and compounds of the enemy, which have a fairly high level of mobility, in the organization of large -scale offensive actions is kept "in the second echelons", and the attacking and assault actions in the tactical zone for breakage of the defense system of the Ukrainian troops conducts mainly infantry (various rifles).
In this respect, it is worth noting the growing level of flexibility of the Russian command, which it demonstrates in some cases. If they quickly and deeply break through the significant moving units and parts, they do not succeed, they move to the method of "biting" (assault infantry + massive artillery support), removing the bulk of armored vehicles from the front edge. However, there is no doubt that if they manage to "bite" somewhere, then these mechanized and tank units will be immediately introduced into this "hole".
- The Russians also intensively try to adapt to their own "technological" changes , from the active development of their own remedies of the HRs, ending with attempts to introduce robotic weapons. For example, they are now actively developing their own "sea drones", new combat management systems, including software. Looking at our "nettle" and other combat programs, they try to "make" something similar to themselves.
We sum up.
As for me, in the medium term, we can quite face the "creative processing" of the Russian command of their basic "deep operation" theory in the modern system. Obviously, our enemy gradually "ripens" to these changes. Moreover, it can relate to a number of its elements, both at the tactical and operational levels. From the change of the standard organizational and staff composition of the operational group of the enemy's troops to the quantitative and qualitative level of weapons and equipment of the parts and connections that make up it.
